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U.S. NAVY TORPEDOES NEPA: WINTER V NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL MAY SINK FUTURE
ENVIRONMENTAL PLEAS BROUGHT UNDER THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF THE CASE: CAUSE OF ACTION,
RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND THE COURT'S DECISION

Over the last half-century, increasing concerns regarding the
human impact on the environment have led to legislative reform
designed to prevent or limit adverse effects on animal life, vegetation and the overall human environment. In 1969, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) ' as the "basic
national charter for the protection of the environment." 2 NEPA
imposes a duty on federal agencies to consider and evaluate poten3
tial environmental impacts resulting from their actions.
1. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
2. 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500.1 (stating NEPA's purpose); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(2006) (declaring NEPA's purpose); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (explaining Congress's recognition of profound impact of human activity on natural environment
and need for maintaining harmonious conditions between humans and environment); see also William S. Eubanks, Damage Done? The Status of NEPA After Winter v.
NRDC and Answers to Lingering Questions Left Open By the Court, 33 VT. L. Rv. 649,

650 (2009) (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500.1 (2009)). Eubanks is an Associate Attorney
at Meyer Glitzenstein & Crystal in Washington, D.C., and participated in the firm's
amicus brief to the Court. Eubanks at 670 n.al, n.dl. NEPA declares the
following:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly
the profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization,
industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding
technological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of
restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare
and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the
Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments,
and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in
a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). NEPA also states Congress's recognition "that each person
shall enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331 (c).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332 (describing duties NEPA imposes on Federal
Government); see also Eubanks, supra note 2, at 650 (stating NEPA's objective).
Congress obliges the Federal Government to:

(353)
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In 2008, the United States Supreme Court in Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council (Winter)4 vacated the District Court for the
Central District of California's preliminary injunction against the
Navy.5 The Court based its decision on the grounds that the lower
courts applied too lenient a standard for analyzing irreparable
harm, and that the lower courts abused their discretion by improperly weighing the factors considered in deciding whether to issue
injunctive relief.6 While the Court's grounds for vacating appear
sturdy and the holding narrow, the Court attacked NEPA by circumventing the central feature of the statute-the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS). 7 Although the Natural Resources Defense
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and
resources to the end that the Nation may(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which
supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will
permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). Federal action includes actions that are subject to federal
control and responsibility. See Save Strawberry Canyon v. Dep't of Energy, 613 F. Supp.
2d 1177, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing 40 C.F.R. 1508.18 (2009)) (stating NEPA's
EIS requirement applies only to federal action); see also Save Strawberry Canyon v.
Dep't of Energy, 2009 WL 1098888 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (upholding preliminary injunction under Winter analysis).
4. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
5. Id. at 382 (vacating lower court's holdings).
6. See id. at 365 (finding errors in lower court's holdings).
7. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 649 (discussing Supreme Court's holding in
Winter in relation to environmental protection available under NEPA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (mandating all Federal Government agencies comply with NEPA). Section
4332(C) particularly describes the EIS:
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official
on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
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Council (NRDC) 8 brought an action for injunctive relief against the
Navy for failing to prepare the necessary EIS and the two lower
courts agreed, the Supreme Court allowed the Navy to continue its
activity, despite a direct violation of NEPA. 9
Overall, this Note discusses NEPA, the criteria and discretion
involved in issuing equitable relief, and the requisite measure of
irreparable harm required for obtaining equitable relief in the
form of a preliminary injunction as presented in Winter.10 Part II
recounts the issues that led to litigation, specifically why the NRDC
argued error on part of the Navy in foregoing an EIS, and why the
NRDC sought injunctive relief."1 Part III explores NEPA, the underlying legal precedents, theories and standards for acquiring equitable relief.12 Part IV addresses the Court's decision to vacate and
reverse the lower courts on two grounds: (1) improper analysis of
irreparable harm and (2) abuse of discretion by improperly weighing the factors for injunctive relief. 13 Part V focuses on the rationale and reasoning of the Court's holding in Winter, in particular
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (i)-(v). CEQ regulations state the following about the EIS:
The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as
an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in
the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal
Government. It shall provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the
reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts
or enhance the quality of the human environment. Agencies shall focus
on significant environmental issues and alternatives and shall reduce
paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous background data. Statements shall be concise, clear, and to the point, and shall be supported by
evidence that the agency has made the necessary environmental analyses.
An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure document.
It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with other relevant
material to plan actions and make decisions.
40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (2009).
8. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371 (describing plaintiffs: NRDC, Jean-Michael Cousteau, and several other environmental groups). The NRDC's claims and interests
in this Note represent the claims and interests of all plaintiffs.
9. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 703 (9th Cir. 2008)
(concluding NRDC met burden of proof for irreparable harm, and public interest
weighed in NRDC's favor at District Court, and Ninth Circuit Court) rev'd, 129 S.
Ct. 365 (2008); see also, Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 365 (reversing lower court).
10. For further discussion of NEPA and equitable relief, see infra notes 16-191
and accompanying text.
11. For further discussion of the facts of the noted case, see infra notes 16-38
and accompanying text.
12. For further discussion of NEPA's background and the precedents and
standards of equitable relief, see infra notes 39-92 and accompanying text.
13. For further discussion of the Court's decision in the noted case, see infra
notes 93-121 and accompanying text.
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the Court's decision to undercut NEPA and ignore the EIS requirement. 14 Part VI concludes with a discussion of the potential lasting
15
effects of the Winter holding.
II.

FACTS:

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE NAVY'S ACTIONS IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WATERS

When engaging in the critical practice of antisubmarine warfare, the Navy deploys "strike groups" comprised of surface ships,
submarines and aircrafts. 16 These strike groups undergo extensive
integrated exercises, which include the use of mid-frequency active
(MFA) sonar. 17 MFA sonar is not only a complex technology requiring comprehensive training, but it is also the most effective
means of detecting enemy submarines-especially near-silent diesel-electric submarines, which are otherwise undetectable.1 8 Navy
sonar operators are responsible for coordinating with the other seabound and air-bound craft of the strike group, while avoiding any
interference.1 9 To ensure sonar operators will perform perfectly,
the Navy regularly executes training exercises under realistic conditions. 20 Southern California water and sea conditions are ideal for
14. For further discussion of the Court's reasoning and rationale, see infra
notes 122-74 and accompanying text.
15. For further discussion of the noted case's impact on future NEPA claims,
see infra notes 175-91 and accompanying text.
16. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 370 (describing strike group composition and acknowledging antisubmarine warfare is Pacific Fleet's top priority). The use of midfrequency active (MFA) sonar is "mission critical" because MFA sonar is the only
method of locating nearly silent, submerged, diesel-electric enemy submarines
running solely on battery power. Id. at 371.
17. See id. at 370-71 (explaining Navy uses MFA sonar and describing differences between active sonar (including MFA sonar) and passive sonar). Active sonar emits pulses of sound underwater and receives acoustic waves echoing off the
target, whereas passive sonar merely receives sound waves without emissions. Id. at
370, n.1. Passive sonar has neither the range of active sonar nor active sonar's
capacity to determine exact location of an enemy submarine. Id. at n.1.
18. See id. at 370-71 (describing complexities of using MFA sonar). Many factors affect sonar reception: water density, salinity, currents, weather conditions and
sea floor contours. Id. The Court notes MFA sonar is a useful tool because it
enables the Navy to determine both the bearing and distance of target submarines,
as well as permits the Navy to track enemy submarines operating more quietly than
the surrounding marine environment. Id. at 370. The Court also notes the Navy's
need for MFA sonar training: "The use of MFA sonar during these exercises is
'missions-critical,' given that MFA sonar is the only proven method of identifying
submerged diesel-electric submarines operating on battery power." Id. at 371.
19. See id. at 370-72 (demonstrating intricacies of sonar use). Strike groups
must complete training exercises to be certified for deployment. Id. at 371.
20. See id. at 370-71 (discussing regular training in realistic conditions and
need for training with MFA sonar).
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conducting this training, which is vital to the Navy's success in anti21
submarine warfare.
While ideal for Navy training operations, Southern California
is also home to an array of marine mammals, including dolphins
and whales. 22 The NRDC contends that the Navy has underestimated the amount and degree of MFA sonar-induced injuries to
marine mammals, including permanent hearing loss, decompression sickness and major behavioral disruptions. 23 The NRDC submits that marine mammals' mass strandings are linked to active
sonar, and that certain species, such as beaked whales, are uniquely
susceptible to injuries from active sonar.2 4 Sonar directly affects the
beaked whale's behavioral patterns, and necropsies of beaked
whales reveal hemorrhaging and embolisms in the bloodstream,
which lead to deaths and strandings. 25 Because these whales dive so
deep, the rapid rise from the depths to the surface in response to
26
MFA transmissions causes injuries and fatalities.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Winter notes the likely occurrence
of 170,000 behavioral disturbances of mammals, which includes
21. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371 (explaining that Southern California is ideal
training location). Southern California waters are the only areas on the West
Coast relatively close to land bases, air bases, sea bases and amphibious landing
areas. Id.
22. See id. (informing at least thirty-seven species of marine mammals live in
Southern California waters).
23. See id. (describing more serious injuries).
24. See id. (associating active sonar with strandings of marine mammals). The
NRDC explained that beaked whales are very deep divers and spend little time at
surface, thus making detection of injuries difficult to ascertain. Id. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The NRDC notes a known sensitivity of beak whales to sonar.
Id. Justice Ginsburg describes the sonar's irreparable harm: "Sonar is linked to
mass strandings of marine mammals hemorrhaging around the brain and ears,
acute spongiotic changes in the central nervous system, and lesions in the vital
organs." Id.
25. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *39-40, 2008 WL 4527982, Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239) (describing why
beaked whales are extremely susceptible to injury and death attributable to active
sonar). NRDC's Counsel presented to the court:
[T]he reason [sonar causes strandings] especially to beak whales is because they dive for very long periods of time. And when they dive for very
long periods of time, and they are then bombarded with sonar, which by
the way in sound intensity, in this courtroom, if we had ajet engine, and
you multiplied that noise by 2,000 times, correcting for water, that's the
sound's intensity that would be going on in the water if you were a
marine mammal near that source.
Id. Because beaked whales dive so deep for such long periods of time, they are
extremely susceptible to injury and death due to active sonar interference causing
them to adjust diving patterns and rise from the depths too quickly. Id.
26. See id. (noting mammals' necropsy results).
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8,000 instances of temporary hearing loss. 27 The predicted number

of long-lasting and permanent injuries to mammals was 564, including 436 injuries to beaked whales-a population of only 1,121.28
All the beaked whale injuries are considered long-lasting and
29
permanent.
The Navy prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) prior
to executing the training exercises to determine the necessity of an
EIS. 30 Concluding that NEPA did not require an EIS, the Navy for-

went preparation of an EIS and continued with its plan for the
training exercises. 3 1 The NRDC claimed the Navy erred in judgment, and argued that the Navy should have continued with an
EIS.32 Subsequent to the commencement of the strike group exer-

cises, the NRDC filed an action seeking injunctive relief on the
33
grounds that the Navy violated, inter alia, NEPA.
27. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 393 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing projected
harm to marine mammals).
28. See id. (addressing potential harm to beak whales in Southern California).
For further discussion of the types of injuries, namely level A and level B, see infra
note 23 and accompanying text.
29. See id. at 372 (defining level A disturbance). Level A disturbances are defined as "potential destruction or loss of biological tissue (i.e. physical injury)." Id.
(citing Navy's appellant petition). Level B harassment is defined as "temporary
injury or disruption of behavioral patterns such as migration, feeding, surfacing,
and breeding." Id. (citing Navy's appellant petition).
30. See id. (stating Navy prepared EA prior to commencing training). In accordance with CEQ regulations, an agency will prepare an EA if it is unsure
whether its actions' effects will significantly affect the environment. Save Strawbery
Canyon v. Dep't of Energy, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1181 (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 1501.4
(2009)). The CEQ has established the following concerning an EA:
Environmental Assessment:
(a) Means a concise public document for which a Federal agency is responsible that serves to:
(1) Briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining
whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of
no significant impact.
(2) Aid an agency's compliance with the Act when no environmental impact statement is necessary.
(3) Facilitate preparation of a statement when one is necessary.
(b) Shall include brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives as required by section 102(2) (E), of the environmental impacts of
the proposed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted.
40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.9 (2009). CEQ regulations also state that an agency may prepare an EA on any action at any time in order to assist agency planning and decisionmaking. 40 C.F.R. pt. 1501.3(b).
31. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372 (stating Navy concluded Southern California
strike group training exercises would not significantly impact environment).
32. See id. at 372 (noting NRDC argues EIS was necessary prior to commencement of proposed actions).
33. See id. (stating NRDC sought relief for violation of NEPA, Endangered
Species Act of 1973 and Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972).
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In August 2007, the District Court for the Central District of
California enjoined the United States Navy from using MFA sonar
during the Navy's strike group training exercises in Southern California.34 The Navy appealed the District Court's ruling, and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the injunction for modification. 35 The Navy challenged two of the six modified injunction
conditions and, after losing at both the district and circuit court
levels, the Navy appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.36 The Supreme Court held that the Navy's interests in effec-

tive and realistic training outweighed the plaintiffs' ecological,
recreational and scientific interests. 37 The Supreme Court, there38
fore, vacated the two challenged injunction conditions.
III.

BACKGROUND: THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
AND THE STANDARDS FOR OBTAINING EQUITABLE RELIEF

NEPA is the United States' premiere federal legislation for holistic protection of the environment. 39 In Winter, the NRDC alleged
that the Navy has violated NEPA by failing to follow particular procedures governing federal agency decision making and action, particularly by failing to prepare an EIS for the Navy's strike group
34. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 645 F. Supp. 2d 841, 855 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (enjoining Navy for violation of NEPA), stay granted pending appeal, 502
F.3d 859, 859 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated and remanded, 508 F.3d 885, 885 (9th Cir.
2007).
35. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Winter, 508 F.3d at 887 (remanding for modification). The Ninth Circuit, in August 2007, first held that the Navy was entitled to
stay of injunction pending an appeal. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 502 F.3d
at 865 (granting stay). Thereafter, in November 2007, the Ninth Circuit remanded
the injunction for modification after determining that the plaintiffs met their burden of proving the need for a preliminary injunction. See Nat. Res. Def. Council,Inc.
v. Winter, 508 F.3d at 886-87 (remanding for modification).
36. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372-74 (granting certiorari). The six conditions
included:
(1) imposing a [twelve]-mile "exclusion zone" from the coastline; (2) using lookouts to conduct additional monitoring for marine mammals; (3)
restricting the use of "helicopter-dipping" sonar; (4) limiting the use of
MFA sonar in geographic "choke points"; (5) shutting down MFA sonar
when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of a vessel; and (6)
powering down MFA sonar by 6dB during significant surface ducting conditions, in which sound travels further than it otherwise would due to
temperature differences in adjacent layers of water.
Id. at 373. The Navy appealed the fifth and sixth conditions. Id.
37. See id. at 381. (holding in favor of Navy).
38. See id. (vacating lower court's injunction).
39. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 649 (discussing NEPA's overarching characteristics and purpose); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332 (2006) (describing Congressional recognition of environmental needs and commitment to improving
environment's quality via legislation).
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training exercises in Southern California. 40 The Supreme Court
discussed the various characteristics of NEPA and addressed the
41
standards for injunctive relief.
A. Keeping Environmental Integrity Afloat: The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
Congress designed and crafted NEPA to promote an overarching commitment to prevent and eliminate environmental damage. 42 NEPA focuses on the particular environmental effects of any

proposed federal agency actions. 4 3 When major federal action proposes to "significantly [affect] the quality of the human environment," NEPA mandates that the acting agency prepare an EIS-a
detailed statement of potential environmental effects accompanied
by a discussion of reasonable alternative courses of action. 44 Before
preparing the more detailed EIS, the Council on Environmental
Quality's (CEQ) 45 regulations permit an agency to prepare an EA
46
to determine whether an EIS is necessary.
40. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372-73 (stating NRDC's allegations and cause of
action).
41. See generally id. at 372-77 (discussing NEPA and addressing equitable
relief).
42. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 649 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214370(f)) (noting NEPA's goals); see also Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371
(1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)) (discussing NEPA's objectives and procedural operation).
43. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 649 (describing NEPA's focus); see also 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321 (stating NEPA's purpose).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (explaining EIS application); Save Strawberry Canyon v. Dep't of Energy, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (discussing detailed statement commonly referred to as EIS and application to federal agency
action). Federal actions are defined as actions potentially subject to federal control and responsibility. Strawberry Canyon, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 1181. A proposed
action need not jeopardize a threatened or endangered species to be considered
as having a significant effect on the environment, triggering the agency's obligation to prepare an EIS. Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 373 F.
Supp. 2d 1069, 1080 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
45. 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.6 (2009) (referring to Council created by NEPA as
Council on Environmental Quality).
46. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1501.4 (instructing whether to prepare EIS); see also Eubanks, supra note 2, at 650 (explaining agency may prepare EA to determine
whether EIS is necessary); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (requiring EIS only where action will significantly impact environment); see also Klamath-Siskiyou, 373 F. Supp.
2d at 1069 (discussing requisite significant harm for obliging agency to prepare EA
or EIS). An agency may forego an EIS if the agency determines its action will not
significantly impact the environment; however, an agency's determination can be
judicially reviewed. Eubanks, supra note 2, at 650. CEQ regulations provide the
following instructions on whether to prepare an EIS:
In determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement
the Federal agency shall:
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The most crucial element of NEPA is the requirement for preparing the EIS before any proposed agency action occurs. 47 Preparing the EIS prior to agency action enables the agency to adequately
assess the potential environmental impacts, and informs the agency
of any reasonable alternatives.

48

(a) Determine under its procedures supplementing these regulations
(described in § 1507.3) whether the proposal is one which:
(1) Normally requires an environmental impact statement, or
(2) Normally does not require either an environmental impact statement
or an environmental assessment (categorical exclusion).
(b) If the proposed action is not covered by paragraph (a) of this section,
prepare an environmental assessment (§ 1508.9). The agency shall involve environmental agencies, applicants, and the public, to the extent
practicable, in preparing assessments required by § 1508.9(a)(1).
(c) Based on the environmental assessment make its determination
whether to prepare an environmental impact statement.
(d) Commence the scoping process (§ 1501.7), if the agency will prepare
an environmental impact statement.
(e) Prepare a finding of no significant impact (§ 1508.13), if the agency
determines on the basis of the environmental assessment not to prepare a
statement.
(1) The agency shall make the finding of no significant impact available
to the affected public as specified in § 1506.6.
(2) In certain limited circumstances, which the agency may cover in its
procedures under § 1507.3, the agency shall make the finding of no significant impact available for public review (including State and areawide
clearinghouses) for 30 days before the agency makes its final determination whether to prepare an environmental impact statement and before
the action may begin. The circumstances are:
(i) The proposed action is, or is closely similar to, one which normally
requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement under
the procedures adopted by the agency pursuant to § 1507.3, or
(ii) The nature of the proposed action is one without precedent.
40 C.F.R. pt. 1501.4.
47. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 650-51 (describing crux of Winter case); see
Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing NEPA's design
to influence decision-making process), affg 560 F. Supp. 561 (1983); see also Sierra
Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500-01 (1st Cir. 1989) (emphasizing NEPA's informed
decision-making objective), vacating in part, 701 F. Supp. 886 (D. Me. 1988).
"[W]hen a decision to which NEPA obligations attach is made without the informed environmental considerations that NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA
intends to prevent has been suffered." Sierra Club, 872 F.2d at 500. CEQ regulations state the importance of following NEPA procedure to ensure informed decision making: "NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information is
available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken." 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500.1.
48. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 650 (explaining crucial timing of EIS preparation); see also 40 C.F.R. pts. 1501.1-2 (commanding agencies to integrate NEPA
procedures as early as possible in decisionmaking making process). CEQ regulations mandate that "[a] gencies shall integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect
environmental values, to avoid delays later in the process, and to head off potential
conflicts." 40 C.F.R. pt. 1501.2.
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1. NEPA'S Sweeping Purpose and Requirements: Environmental
Assessments and Environmental Impact Statements
For almost four decades, NEPA has served as the Nation's policy to "encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment" by reducing or preventing damage to the environment, and by promoting an understanding of the complex
ecological systems which humans influence and in which humans
interact. 49 Rather than mandating certain results to fulfill NEPA's
objectives, NEPA imposes procedural requirements as the means to
achieving its end. 50 These requirements compel federal agencies to
51
analyze the potential impact of their actions on the environment.
To ensure compliance with NEPA and appropriate interpreta52
tions of its procedural requirements, NEPA established the CEQ.
The CEQ promulgated regulations to assist agencies in determining which of their actions are subject to an EIS. 53 These regulations

allow an agency to first produce an EA, a more limited document
than an EIS, to determine if the agency's action will significantly
effect the environment. 54 The EA is concise and brief, providing
only sufficient evidence and analysis in the course of determining

49. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) (discussing overall
goals of NEPA); see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1979) (explaining purposes of NEPA). NEPA provides:
The purposes of this Act are: to declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere and to stimulate the health and welfare
of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation...
42 U.S.C. § 4321.
50. See Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 756-57 (stating NEPA is comprised of procedural requirements rather than commanding specific results form agency action); see
also Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Counci 490 U.S. 360, 370 (1989) (stating NEPA does
not mandate agencies achieve specific results in regards to environment, but promotes goals to prevent or mitigate environmental damage by focusing agency and
public attention on environmental effects of proposed agency action).
51. See Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 756-67 (explaining NEPA duties imposed on
federal agencies).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (establishing CEQ); see also Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at
757 (addressing formation of CEQ).
53. See Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 757 (stating CEQ promulgates regulations
under NEPA's authority to guide agencies in determining which of its actions are
subject to EIS).
54. See id. (stating basic threshold for requiring EIS after preparing EA). The
Court also explained: "The EA is to be a 'concise public document' that [b]riefly
provide [s] sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an
[EIS]." Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol21/iss2/5

10

Stellakis: U.S. Navy Torpedoes NEPA: Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Cou

2010]

CASENOTE

whether an EIS is required. 55 The EIS, conversely, is a "detailed
written statement" that must discuss "all environmental impacts, unavoidable impacts, and alternatives to the proposed action." 56 Ef5 7
fectuating an EIS places a greater burden on the preparer.
Where an agency conducts an EA and determines an EIS is
unnecessary under NEPA and CEQ regulations, the agency must
issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), which briefly explains why the agency's actions will not have a significant impact on
the environment. 58 An agency's decision to issue a FONSI and
forgo the preparation of an EIS, however, is not final. 59 The decision can be challenged and set aside if the challengers show the
decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 60 The Navy's decision to
forgo the EIS preparation is precisely the NRDC's concern in this
6
NEPA action. '
2.

"Action-forcing'"2 Characteristicsof NEPA

The Supreme Court has referred to section 102 (2) (c) as one of
NEPA's "action-forcing procedures," designed to ensure its imple55. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.9 (describing EA); see also Eubanks, supra note 2, at
663-64 (discussing specifications of EA).
56. Eubanks, supra note 2, at 663-64 (discussing EIS's specifications and obligations); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (discussing EIS requirements). An EIS carries a greater burden on the preparer than an EA: "EISs are subject to far more
stringent requirements for public participation than EAs, including such duties as
requiring agencies to provide notice of draft, final, or supplemental EIS; inviting
public comment on all EISs; and responding to all comments to EISs." Eubanks,
supra note 2, at 663-64.
57. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 663-64 (discussing increased burden of EIS
on preparer).
58. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 1501.4, 1508.13 (prescribing FONSI procedure); see also
Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 757-58 (describing issuance of FONSI). CEQ regulations
provide that an agency shall issue a FONSI if the agency determines an EIS is
unnecessary after preparing an EA. 40 C.F.R. pt. 1501.4. A FONSI is a report
issued by a federal agency which includes the EA and briefly describes why an
action, not otherwise excluded under 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.4, will not significantly
impact the human environment. 40 C.F.R. 1508.13.
59. See Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 763 (stating agency's decision to forgo EIS can
be challenged and set aside). If a plaintiff can show the FONSI was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,"
then the agency's decision to not prepare an EIS can be set aside. Id. (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2006)).
60. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 763 (discussing procedure and burden of proof
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)).
61. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 372 (2008) (stating
NRDC's cause of action in relation to NEPA).
62. 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (stating primary purpose of EIS is action-forcing
device); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500.1 (labeling section 102(c) of NEPA). CEQ
regulations state, "Section 102(2) contains 'action-forcing' provisions to make sure

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

11

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5

364 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. XXI: p. 353

mentation. 63 Section 102 provides that Congress shall direct all federal agencies to include a detailed statement on proposals for any
"major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment. '64 The rationale for this detailed statement is
to incorporate the environmental concerns into the decision-mak65
ing process of the agency action.
NEPA's EIS action-forcing characteristic accomplishes two
objectives: (1) consideration of environmental impacts and (2) assurance that relevant information is made available to the public
for potential input. 66 The EIS ensures that the agency obtains and

carefully considers information regarding significant impacts on
the environment during the decision-making process. 6 7 Additionally, the EIS guarantees that the relevant information pertaining to
a proposed action's environmental impacts are disseminated to the

that federal agencies act according to the letter and spirit of the Act." 40 C.F.R. pt.
1500.1. The Senate introduced the term "action-forcing" during its consideration
of NEPA. The term implies that preparing an EIS guarantees that the
environmental goals laid out in NEPA are woven into the planning and actions of
agencies. Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989).
63. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979) (stating NEPA contains
action-forcing procedures to ensure policy implementation); see also 40 C.F.R. pt.
1500.1 (discussing NEPA's action-forcing characteristics).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006); see also Marsh, 490 U.S. at 372 (discussing
section 102(2)(C)). CEQ regulations define the term "significantly" as requiring
considerations of both context and intensity:
Context... means that the significance of an action must be analyzed in
several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national) the affected
region, the affected interest, and the locality. Significance varies with the
setting of the proposed action... Intensity... refers to the severity of the
impact...
40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.27. The EIS must include:
[T] he environmental impact of the proposed action; any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should he proposed action be
implemented; alternatives to the proposed action; the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity; and, any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C); see also Andrus, 442 U.S. at 350 (discussing NEPA section
102(2) (C)).
65. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1501.1 (stating importance of integrating NEPA process
at early stages of planning and decision making); see also Andrus, 442 U.S. at 350
(discussing rationale for incorporating concerns of significant impact into decision
making).
66. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)
(describing NEPA's significant action-forcing goals).
67. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1501.1 (explaining NEPA integration at early stages of
planning); see also Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349 (stating action-forcing purposes).
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public, who might then have input in both the decision-making
68
process and the execution of agency action.
Without taking the environmental concerns into consideration, an agency vitiates the entire purpose of the action-forcing
qualities of NEPA. 69 The CEQ and its regulations promote and em70
phasize the significance of preparing an EIS, when appropriate.
The CEQ has promulgated regulations mandating that agencies integrate NEPA's procedural requirements at their earliest planning
stages to ensure adequate consideration of the environment.7 1 The
NRDC brought the action at issue to enjoin the Navy from using
MFA sonar because the NDRC claims that the Navy's failure to prepare an EIS violated NEPA.7 2 The NRDC also claims that the only
way to enforce NEPA and its objectives is for the Court to grant
73
injunctive relief.

68. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (explaining EIS will foster full and fair discussion
of environmental impacts and inform decision-makers and public); see also Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349 (stating action-forcing purposes). NEPA attempts to ensure
environmental effects are not ignored or downplayed by forcing the agency to give
due attention and consideration to these effects when deciding whether to act and
how to act. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349.
69. See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351 (addressing vitality of EIS and its role in
agency action decision-making process).
70. See id. at 351 (noting CEQ's regulations implementing NEPA).
71. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 1501.1-2; see also Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351 (noting environmental concerns were traditionally ignored and omitted from early agency
planning). The Andrus Court noted:
CEQ regulations state that '[t]he primary purpose of an environmental
impact statement is to serve as an action forcing device to ensure that the
policies and goals defined in [NEPA] are infused into the on-going programs and actions of the Federal Government... An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by
Federal official in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.'
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 n.3 (1979) (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1
(2009)). President Carter's Executive Order No. 11991 mandated that CEQ regulations impose duties on agencies to prepare EISs early in the decision-making
process. Id. CEQ regulations, therefore, require that the EIS should be prepared
.early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the
decisionmaking [sic] process and will not be used to rationalize orjustify decision
already made ...." Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.5 (2009)). It should also be
noted that the CEQ's interpretations of NEPA should be given substantial deference. Id. at 358.
72. See Winterv. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 387 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (addressing Navy's failure to prepare EIS before Navy's actions significantly impacted human environment).
73. See Eubanks, supranote 2, at 655 (stating injunctive relief is only means of
enforcing NEPA and its EIS to protect environment).
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Equitable Relief, Preliminary Injunctions, and Irreparable
Harm
1.

Equitable Relief and Obtaininga Preliminary Injunction

As an equitable remedy, injunctive relief is not issued as a matter of course.7 4 Rather, courts of equity issue injunctive relief only
where the court's intervention is essential to effectuate protection
against what would otherwise be an irremediable injury. 75 Injunctions require a demonstration that irreparable harm is likely and
that legal remedies would be inadequate; courts must balance competing claims of injury while considering the effect on each party of
granting or denying the relief.76 Courts also give particular regard

77
to public interest when deciding whether to issue an injunction.
An applicant for preliminary injunction must establish four criteria: "(1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) likelihood of suffering irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) the balance
of equities tips in favor of the applicant, and (4) an injunction is in
the public interest." 78 Arguably, one of the most important criteria
for an applicant seeking a preliminary injunction is demonstrating
the likelihood of irreparable harm. v9 When faced with competing
74. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982) (describing
injunction as equitable relief never awarded out of right or to restrain merely trifling injurious acts); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vil. of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 541, 542
(stating bases for injunctive relief). For further discussion of elements required to
obtain injunctive relief, see Wright, infra note 73 and accompanying text.
75. See Romerco-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312 (noting criteria for issuing injunctive
relief and threshold for obtaining injunctive relief); see also GambelU, 480 U.S. at 342
(discussing criteria for injunctive relief).
76. See Gambei4 480 U.S. at 542 (discussing bases for injunctive relief). The
Court discussed the bases for relief as follows:
[T] he bases for injunctive relief are irreparable injury and inadequacy of
legal remedies. In each case, a court must balance the competing claims
of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or
withholding of the requested relief. Although particular regard should
be given to the public interest, "[t]he grant ofjurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggest an absolute duty to do so under any
and all circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not
mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law."
Id. at 542.
77. See id. at 545 (noting importance of public interest factor when exercising
equitable discretion).
78. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374 (describing requirements for obtaining preliminary injunction).
79. See CHARLEs
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2948.1, 11A FPP § 2948.1 (2010) (explaining
standards for obtaining preliminary injunction); see also Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at
312 (stating basis for injunctive relief is both irreparable injury and inadequacy of
remedies at law). The applicant for a preliminary injunction must prove a likelihood that irreparable harm will occur-speculative injury will not suffice. WRIGHT,
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claims of injury, a court must balance the parties' potential injuries
resulting from the grant or denial of the injunction.8 0
2. EnvironmentalInjuries and the IrreparableHarm Standard
The Supreme Court in Amoco Production Company v. Village of
Gambell, AK (Gambell) ,81 a case on which the Winter Court relied,
noted that environmental injuries by their very nature rarely find
adequate remedies at law through monetary damages-they are
often permanent or at least of long duration, otherwise known as
irreparable.8 2 Where environmental injury is sufficiently likely, the
8 3
balance of harms will usually favor issuing an injunction.
Despite the presumption of irreparable harm tied into environmental injuries, the Court has emphasized the totality of the factors
it must consider in deciding whether to issue injunctive relief.8 4 In
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo (Romero-Barcelo),85 the Court reversed
the First Circuit's issuance of an injunction against the Navy.8 6 Although the ground for reversal was the First Circuit's improper appellate review, the Court discussed the factors for issuing injunctive
relief at length andJustice Powell's concurrence notes the "reasonableness of [the district court's] decision in light of all the pertinent
87
factors" to withhold relief.
In Gambell, the Court emphasized its need to balance competing injuries of the parties and consider the effects thereupon in
& KANE, Chapter 9, Rule 65(B), § 2948.1, 11A FPP § 2948.1. "[T]here
must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of the applicant." Id. Courts
will not issue a preliminary injunction to prevent the possibility of some "remote
future injury"; current and existing threat must be proven. Id. Injury need not be
inflicted when applicant is seeking preliminary injunction, applicant need only
MILLER

show a strong threat of irreparable harm. Id.
80. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312 (describing court of equity's duty to
balance competing interests of injury between opposing parties when deciding to
grant or deny injunction).
81. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
82. See Gambel 480 U.S. at 545 (describing inability to cure environmental

injury via money damages).
83. See id. (stating balance will usually tip in favor of injunction if environmental injury is likely).
84. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381-82 (holding that upon consideration of factors, decision tips in favor of Navy); see also, Gambell, 480 U.S. at 542 (addressing
factors to be considered in issuing relief).
85. 465 U.S. 305 (1882).
86. See id. (reversing First Circuit's instructions ordering District Court to issue injunctive relief).
87. Id. at 321 n.* (Powell, J., concurring) (noting district court's
reasonableness).
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granting or denying relief.88 The Gambell Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit's issuance of an injunction, addressing
the error in presuming irreparable damage where an agency fails to
evaluate the environmental impact of the agency's action as "contrary to traditional equitable principles ... "89 The Court also emphasized with particularity the significant role of the public interest
factor in exercising equitable discretion. 90 While the Court discusses the nearly inherent irreparability of environmental harms
and damages, it constantly reminds lower courts of the other factors
involved in equitable discretion and the issuance of injunctive relief.91 Meeting the burden of proving likelihood of success on the
merits and irreparable harm can be vastly outweighed by the public
92
interest or competing interest of the other party.
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: THE COURT ESTABLISHES THE

IRREPARABLE HARM STANDARD AND REVIEWS THE LOWER
COURTS' DISCRETION

The Court faced two significant issues when it reversed the

Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm two of the six preliminary injunction conditions.9 3 One issue was the district court's improper standard for issuing the preliminary injunction under the possibility of

irreparable harm.9 4 The other issue was the district court's abuse of
95
equitable discretion in issuing the injunction.
88. See Gambell, 480 U.S. at 542 (discussing balance of competing injuries as
significant factor in deciding whether to issue injunctive relief).
89. Id. at 544-45 (noting error in presuming irreparable harm where agency
fails to properly evaluate environmental impact of proposed action).
90. See id. (emphasizing factor of public interest in exercising equitable discretion); see also Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 312 (highlighting public interest factor).
91. See Gambel, 480 U.S. at 545 (addressing importance of other facts considered in issuing injunctive relief despite inherent irremediable nature of environmental injuries).
92. See id. (describing importance of public interest factor); see also RomeroBarcelo, 465 U.S. 312 (emphasizing particular regard for public consequences in
exercising discretion for equitable relief); see also Internet Specialties W, Inc. v. MilonDiGiorgioEnter., Inc., 559 F.3d 985, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Winter on
grounds of insufficient similarity between public interest in national security and
public interest in customer's interests at issue); see also Save Strawberry Canyon v.
Dep't of Energy, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (distinguishing
Winter via second prong of injunctive relief determination in Ninth Circuit).
93. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 129 S.Ct. 365, 365 (2008) (reversing
lower court).
94. See id. (holding lower court failed to use proper irreparable harm
standard).
95. See id. (holding lower court abused discretion by failing to properly account for public interest).
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Preliminary Injunction Standard: Possibility of Irreparable
Harm is Too Lenient

While the NRDC demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success of winning on the merits, the NRDC did not establish that
there was a likelihood of irreparable harm. 96 The district court and
the Ninth Circuit held in favor of the NRDC based "only on a 'possibility' of irreparable harm."97 The Supreme Court emphasized that

the proper threshold for issuing a preliminary injunction is for the
applicant to prove a likelihood of irreparable harm-not merely a
possibility of irreparable harm. 98
Distinguishing between these two standards is extremely important because the issuance of a preliminary injunction based on
mere possibility is inconsistent with the Court's classification of injunctive relief.9 9 Injunctive relief is an "extraordinary remedy." 10 0
As an extraordinary remedy, injunctive relief shall only be awarded
where the applicant has met the higher burden of proof-likelihood-whereby the applicant is entitled to this remedy. 10 1
B.

Granting Injunctive Relief: The Lower Courts' Abuse of
Discretion in Issuing Equitable Relief
1.

Underestimatingthe Burden of Injunctive Relief

The Supreme Court held that the district court and the Ninth
Circuit gave inadequate consideration to the burden that the preliminary injunction would impose on the Navy's ability to effectively
train its sailors. 10 2 The complexities, subtleties and professional decisions concerning the training and control of armed forces are "es96. See id. at 375 (noting NRDC demonstrated only possibility of irreparable
harm). The NRDC did not meet the proper standard of likelihood of irreparable
harm. Id. It should be noted that courts have proposed a relaxed standard of
irreparable harm for claims brought under NEPA. Eubanks, supra note 2, at 655.
Justice Breyer's First Circuit opinions in Massachusetts v. Watt and Sierra Club v.
Marsh call for courts to account for the potentially irreparable nature of uninformed decision-making. See Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir.
1983) (making uninformed decisions to which NEPA obligations attach is harm
suffered); see Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500-01 (1st Cir. 1989) (failing to
make informed decisions in violation of NEPA is harm suffered).
97. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374-82 (discussing lower courts' holdings).
98. See id. (agreeing with Navy's argument that possibility standard is too
lenient).
99. See id. at 375-76 (rationalizing distinction between possibility standard and
likelihood standard for issuing injunctive relief).
100. Id. (noting extraordinary quality of injunctive relief).
101. See id. 375-76 (requiring proof of likelihood to issue injunctive relief).
102. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377 (holding lower courts understated preliminary injunction burden imposed on Navy).
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sentially professional military judgments," and thus entitled to great
deference. 10 3 Upon review, the Court accepted the officers' reports
that the MFA sonar use under the realistic Southern California
training exercise conditions was "of the utmost importance to the
10 4
Navy and the Nation."
In deeming the Navy's concerns about the injunction as "speculative," the majority found that the district court failed to give due
weight to the military officers' judgments in predicting the reliefs
adverse impact on the vital training exercises. 0 5 The preliminary
injunction would "clearly increase the number of disruptive sonar
shutdowns" during training. 10 6 The Navy stated the dire importance of limiting the number of sonar shutdowns during its Joint
Tactical Forces Training Exercises, which can last up to two weeks
at a time.1 0 7 The increased frequency of stopping and starting
would cause operational commanders to "lose awareness of the tactical situation," and receive inadequate training.1 0 8 The Court further noted that it did not discount the importance of the NRDC's
claims and interests, particularly ecological, scientific and recreational interests in marine mammals.' 0 9 These interests, however,
are greatly outweighed by the Navy's interest in effective and realistic training. 1 10
2. Error in Balancing the Public Interest
Despite the discussion of the proper standards for granting a
preliminary injunction, the Court found that the NRDC would lose
103. Id. (addressing complexities of case details concerning military officers'
professional judgments). Justices and federal judges are generally unfamiliar with
the complexities and gravity of the training and control of the armed forces. Id.
The Court reaffirmed "giv[ing] great deference to the professional judgments of
military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest." Id. (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)) (establishing
deference to military judgments concerning importance of particular military
interest).
104. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377 (accepting military officer reports on significance of using MFA sonar and hosting realistic conditions).
105. See id. at 378 (addressing lower courts' lack of deference to professional

judgments).
106. Id. at 379 (addressing burden of preliminary injunction on Navy).
107. See id. (discussing Navy officers' concerns regarding inadequate
training).
108. Id. (discussing Navy Admiral's explanation of adverse results of training

interruptions).
109. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 382 (noting importance of environmental group
activities).
110. See id. at 378 (concluding balance of equities and public interest tips in
favor of Navy).
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regardless of proving the irreparable harm. 1"1 ' Even if the NRDC
had shown irreparable harm resulting from the Navy's Southern
California exercises, the public interest in national security linked
with the Navy's interest in effective training simply outweighs any
such injuries. 112 The competing interests of the Navy and the public interest notably intertwine because they both focus on national
security.
Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies and are
never granted as of right. 113 Courts must balance the competing
injury claims, as well as consider the potential effects on each party
if the injunction is granted or denied. 1 4 When exercising their discretion, courts of equity must also account for their decisions' conl1 5
sequences, particularly those concerning the public interest.
Here, the Court found that the district court and the Ninth Circuit
understated the burden of the preliminary injunction on the Navy's
ability to train and the subsequent adverse impact on the public
interest in national defense."16
The Court discusses, at length, its deference to the judgments
and assessments of military personnel. 117 The majority accepts the
officers' assertions regarding the dire necessity of realistic training,
which the two challenged conditions would inhibit."18 If the Court
affirmed the injunction, it might well force the Navy to deploy inadequately trained antisubmarine forces, jeopardizing the fleet's
safety and the safety of American citizens. 119 If the Court vacated
the injunction, however, it faced the near certainty of injuries to
marine mammals in Southern California waters and injuries to the
111. See id. at 376 (stating any injuries outweighed by national security
interest).
112. See id. (weighing factors in consideration of issuing injunctive relief). Ac-

cording to the majority, "A proper consideration of these factors alone requires
denial of the requested injunctive relief." Id.
113. See id. at 375-76 (explaining injunctive relief is extraordinary remedy

never awarded as of right).
114. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375-76 (describing balancing of equities factor for
consideration in deciding whether to issue injunctive relief).
115. See id. at 376-77 (addressing public interest factor for consideration in
deciding whether to issue injunctive relief); see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456
U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (discussing particular regard for public consequences in fash-

ioning injunctive relief).
116. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377 (stating lower courts understated preliminary
injunction's burden imposed on Navy).
117. See id. at 377-78 (noting Court's deference to military officials and Navy

officers).
118. See id. (deferring to military officials' and Navy officers' professional
judgments).
119. See id. at 378 (discussing effects of affirming injunction).
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public's ecological, scientific and recreational interest. 120 Weighing
the interests of the public, the Court found that the overall public
21
interest strongly favored the Navy.'
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS: SAVE THE EIS FOR LATER: THE NATIONAL

SECURITY INTEREST TIDAL WAVE AND THE CRESTING OF
IRREPARABLE HARM

The Supreme Court's holding in Winter allowed the Navy to
avoid preparing an EIS in accordance with NEPA. 122 This holding
is inconsistent with NEPA's protective characteristics, which may increase the burden on future NEPA pleas for environmental protection. 123 The Court's holding fails to adhere to NEPA's actionforcing procedural requirement-the EIS-which is the center of
the legislation.' 24 The Court also directed its focus to national security.' 25 In exercising its equitable discretion by balancing the equities and evaluating the public interest, the Court bypassed the
Navy's failure to comply with NEPA and skirted the issue of irrepa126
rable harm.
A.

Failure to Adhere to NEPA's Action-forcing Procedures

Serving as the heart of NEPA, the EIS fulfills Congress's environmental protection objectives by ensuring that NEPA's policies
127
and goals are intertwined with the Federal agencies' actions.
NEPA's primary goal is informed decision making. 128 Agencies operating under NEPA's obligations also have an affirmative duty to garner public involvement, giving the public an opportunity for
120. See id. at 378 (discussing effects of vacating injunction).
121. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 378 (concluding public interest in Navy's training
outweighs potential environmental injuries and irreparable harms).
122. Eubanks, supra note 2, at 649 (analyzing effects of Court's holding).
123. See id. (discussing holding's effects on NEPA).
124. See id. at 650 (affirming EIS is NEPA's lynchpin).
125, See id. (describing Winter as national security case).
126, See id. at 649-50 (viewing matter as national security case rather than substantive environmental case).
127. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 650 (noting EIS is crux of NEPA and serves
to ensure fulfillment of Congressional goals and objectives). The EIS must "provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform
decision-makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid
or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment."
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (2009)).
128. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 649-50 (stating NEPA's primary goal); see
also 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332 (2006) (explaining NEPA's goals and obliging federal
government to use practicable means to improve plans and actions affecting
environment).
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meaningful participation in the NEPA process as Congress intended.' 29 The EIS, therefore, must be prepared prior to imple30
menting agency action.'
The EIS "shall be used . .. in conjunction with other relevant

materials to plan actions and make decisions, rather than to justify
decisions already made."'13 In other words, the timing of an
132 Jusagency's EIS submission is essential to NEPA's primary goal.
tice Ginsburg's dissent in Winter highlights NEPA's procedural nature and the pre-action EIS preparation requirement. 133 Justice
Ginsburg frames the central issue as "whether the Navy must prepare an EIS."' 1 34 Justice Ginsburg points out that the Navy did not

challenge its obligation to prepare an EIS pursuant to NEPA. 135 In
fact, the Navy submits that it will prepare and complete an EIS
about a month after the completion of its Southern California
36
exercises.'
Justice Ginsburg's main argument against the majority is that
the Navy acted first, "thwarting the very purpose an EIS is intended
to serve."'1 3 7 The dissent would have upheld the district court's imposition of injunctive conditions until the Navy's completion of the
EIS as a careful balancing of the equities, and not as an abuse of its
138
equitable discretion.

129. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 651 (describing how public input is required part of NEPA process); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500.2 (2009) (commanding
federal agencies to encourage and facilitate public involvement in decision-making
process for NEPA governed actions).
130. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 651 (addressing timing of EIS preparation);
see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.2(f) (stating agencies must complete EIS before taking
any action considered therein).
131. Eubanks, supra note 2, at 651 (discussing CEQ regulations regarding
EIS's use and purpose); see also 40 C.F.R. pts. 1502.1-2. CEQ regulations mandate,
"Agencies shall not commit resources prejudicing selection of alternatives before
making a final decision. [EISs] shall serve as the means of assessing the environmental impact of proposed actions, rather than justifying decisions already made."
40 C.F.R. pt. 1502. 2 (f)-(g).
132. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 650-51 (noting importance of submitting
EIS for planning and decision-making); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (explaining
purpose of EIS).
133. See Winterv. Nat Res. Def. Counci4 129 S. Ct. 365, 389 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing integration of environmental concerns into agency
decisionmaking).
134. Id. at 387 (framing dissent's view on issue in question).
135. See id. (noting Navy concedes obligation to prepare EIS).
136. See id. (stating Navy will complete EIS after training).
137. Id. (offering dissent's conclusion).
138. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 387 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing reasons
for dissenting opinion).
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Stranding Environmental Pleas in the Wake of National
Security Interests

The Court placed overwhelming emphasis on the national security interest of the public and the Navy when it considered the
district court's exercise of discretion to offer a preliminary injunction.8 9 The balance of equities and consideration of public interest are significant factors in assessing the propriety of issuing
injunctive relief.140 Although these are only two of the factors involved in determining whether to issue equitable relief, the Winter
Court makes vastly dominant factors, especially by combining the
141
joint interests of the public and the Navy in national security.
Unlike Justice Ginsburg's dissent, the majority did not address
the underlying merits of the case because the majority found the
grant of injunctive relief to be an abuse of discretion: "[W] e find
[the Navy's] interests, and the documented risks to national security, clearly outweigh the harm on the other side of the balance. 1 4 2
The Court admitted that even if the NRDC did in fact prove a likelihood of irreparable harm (and likelihood of success on the merits),
the Ninth Circuit would still have abused its discretion in affirming
the injunction because the public interest in national security and
the Navy's interest in effective training to ensure national defense
143
outweigh any injury presented by the NRDC.
In recent history, the Court has vacated and reversed Circuit
1 44
Courts for exercising equitable discretion to issue injunctions.
In Gambell, the Court found that injury was not at all probable, and
139. See id. at 370, 373, 376, 378, 380, 382 (emphasizing national security interest). It is interesting to note that the majority opens and closes its opinion with

quotes from former presidents regarding national security. Id. at 370, 382.
George Washington is quoted, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual
means of preserving peace". Id. at 370. Theodore Roosevelt is quoted, "[T]he
only way in which a navy can ever be made efficient is by practice at sea, under all
the conditions which would have to be met if war existed." Id. at 382.
140. See id. at 381 (describing several factors for assessing propriety of injunctive relief).
141. See id. 374, 382 (describing criteria required for issuing preliminary in-

junction and explaining Navy and public interests in national security outweigh
environmental interests).
142. Id. at 381 (addressing Justice Ginsburg's dissent).
143. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376 (noting extraordinary weight of public inter-

est in Navy's effective training and Navy's interest in effective, realistic training).
"A proper consideration of these factors alone requires denial of the requested
relief." Id. (showing overwhelming significance of public interest and balance of
equities factors).
144. See generally Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. Of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 531,
546 (1987) (vacating and remanding Ninth Circuit's issuance of preliminary injunction); see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 305 (1982) (reversing
and remanding Court of Appeals instructing district court to enjoin Navy).
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that the enjoined party would suffer greatly because it had already
invested financially in its project. 14 5 The Romero-Barcelo Court
found that although the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA) does not preclude courts' equitable discretion, the
FWPCA limits the exercise of this discretion to order relief neces146
sary to ensure compliance therewith.
In Winter, the Court hangs its harpoon on the public interest
and the balance of equities factors. 147 Because the lower courts
used an insufficient standard for irreparable harm, the majority
quickly addressed that issue and focused mostly on the public and
Navy's interests in national security. 148 The Court emphasizes, however, that the lower courts would have abused their discretion in
issuing the injunction even if the NRDC proved a likelihood of irreparable harm. 149 The majority justifies this conclusion by claiming that the NRDC's issue is the preparation of an EIS, not that the
Navy must cease MFA sonar practice.' 5 0 Accordingly, courts have
other remedial options to force the preparation of the EIS, rather
51
than enjoining Navy training in the interim.'
Justice Ginsburg's dissent highlights that this rationale defeats
NEPA's entire purpose.' 52 National security is an extraordinary interest for the Navy in the balance of equities and for the public
interest, but the majority stranded environmental pleas in the wake
of national security. 153 The Navy previously trained under similar
conditions imposed by the injunction, and has even certified strike
15 4
groups not having completed all requisite training exercises.
145. See Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545 (finding injury to subsistence resources was
not probable).
146. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320 (finding legislation limits court's exercise of equitable discretion).
147. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376 (holding abuse of discretion even if NRDC

proved irreparable harm).
148. See id. at 381 (examining balance of equities and consideration of public
interest in assessing injunctive relief). The district court used the word

"probability" concerning irreparable harm, and the Ninth Circuit used the phrase
.near certainty" in regards to irreparable harm. Id. at 372-73.
149. See id. at 376 (acknowledging vast weight of Navy's and public's interest).
150. See id. at 381 (stating NRDC's ultimate claim is EIS preparation, and not
against MFA sonar in and of itself). The majority saw "no basis for jeopardizing

national security, as the present injunction does." Id.

151. See id. (mentioning alternative remedial options including declaratory
relief or injunction tailored to preparing EIS).
152. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 389-90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (addressing
NEPA objectives in relation to timing of EIS preparation, namely obliging consid-

eration of environment in decision making).
153. See id. at 382 (addressing how weight of national security interest outweighs environmental interests).
154. See id. at 380-81 (explaining training conditions).
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The Court's majority seems to usher in a parade of horribles: the
injunction conditions impaired or extended training; impaired or
extended training makes for less well-prepared sailors; less well-prepared sailors weaken the Navy; the weakened Navy leaves the
United States vulnerable to foreign attacks or reconnaissance; and,
therefore, our national security would be at risk. 155 Despite the interest in national security, the Navy failed to comply with NEPA,
and the only way to enforce compliance with NEPA is to stop that
15 6
activity-which requires an EIS-until the EIS is prepared.
The district court's blanket injunction was initially revamped
into six measures designed to mitigate damages allegedly resulting
from the training.15 7 The Navy could still train in Southern California and use MFA sonar, but would be obliged to do so in compli58
ance with the conditions of the District Court's injunction.
These conditions may or may not cause increased stoppage in the
training, but without the EIS it is unclear whether training should
have commenced in the first place. 159 Regardless of all the prior
litigation, the majority used national security as the overbearing interest and drowned the lower courts' exercise of equitable discretion in issuing the relief.160
C.

Irreparable Harm Help-Except for he Whales

The Court seemingly raised the bar on the irreparable harm
standard for NEPA claims, thus making all things equal-except for
the whales.' 6' Gambell made clear that the presumption of irreparable harm where an agency fails to adequately evaluate the potential
environmental impact is impermissible. 1 62 Simultaneously, the
Gambell Court also announced that because environmental injury
can seldom find an adequate remedy, when such injury is suffi155. See id. at 379-81 (describing potential effects of injunction).
156. See id. at 390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that if Navy had prepared
EIS before commencing Southern California training, NEPA would have functioned properly without problems).
157. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372-73 (addressing mitigation measures in form
of injunctive relief).
158. See id. at 372-73 (discussing injunction conditions).
159. See id. at 379 (stating increased likelihood of stoppage).
160. See id. at 370, 382 (reversing Ninth Circuit and District Court).
161. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 656, 670 (noting effects of Winter on lenient

standard of irreparable harm for NEPA claims).
162. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. Of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 541 (1987)
(reversing Ninth Circuit's presumption of irreparable harm when agency fails to

thoroughly evaluate environmental impact of proposed action); see also Eubanks,
supra note 2, at 653 (discussing Court's reversal of Ninth Circuit's presumption of
irreparable harm).
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ciently likely the balance of equities generally favors issuing an injunction to prevent damage or harm to the environment.1 63 The
post-Gambell trend, therefore, has been to apply a more lenient ir16 4
reparable harm standard when NEPA is at issue.
Under the "statutory scheme and purpose" approach, NEPA's
text supports the theory that injunctive relief is the only means
through which courts can ensure agency compliance.1 65 NEPA differs greatly from the Alaska National Interest Land Control Act
(ANILCA) in Gambell and the FWPCA in Romero-Barcelo because
NEPA contains only procedural requirements.1 66 Courts have
demonstrated a more relaxed showing of irreparable harm for injunctive relief for a NEPA claim, contrary to claims under ANILCA
67
and FWPCA, because of NEPA's unique procedure-only status.
Justice Breyer, while serving on the First Circuit, provided an
analysis of the relaxed irreparable harm standard for NEPA actions. 168 When NEPA obligates an agency to consider environmental implications in its actions and that agency acts uninformed, then
the harm intended to be prevented has already occurred. 169 NEPA
seeks to minimize any risk of harm to the environment by having
agencies evaluate the circumstances of their proposed actions in relation to the environment. 70 Justice Breyer held that courts should
take into account the "potentially irreparable nature" of unin163. See Gambe, 480 U.S. at 545 (addressing lack of remedy for environmental damage and general practice to issue protective injunction); see also Eubanks,
supra note 2, at 654 (stating Court's rationale in Gambell regarding severity of environmental injury).
164. See Eubanks, supranote 2, at 656 (noting more lenient standard of irreparable harm under NEPA).
165. See id. at 654 (supporting with NEPA text assertion that injunction is
only means by which to ensure compliance with NEPA). Under the "statutory
scheme and purpose" approach, the statute's text guides the court's equitable balancing test. Id. NEPA's substantive goal to serve as the national charter for environmental protection, as indicated by Congress, can be accomplished only
through compliance with the legislation. Id.
166. See id. (distinguishing NEPA from FWPCA and ANILCA on grounds that
FWPCA and ANILCA contain substantive requirements, whereas NEPA only contains procedural requirements); see also Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st
Cir. 1983) (distinguishing F'APCA from NEPA).
167. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 654 (describing relaxed requisite showing
of irreparable harm for NEPA claims, as opposed to claims under FWPCA and
ANILCA).

168. See id. at 654 (explaining relaxed irreparable harm standard for claims
brought under NEPA).
169. See Watt, 716 F.2d at 952 (describing NEPA's aim to inform government
officials and that NEPA seeks to prevent harm from uninformed decision making).
170. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500-01 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing
relationship between risks of irreparable harm and NEPA's objective to minimize
risk of uninformed decision-making).
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formed decision making and its increased risk of harm to the envi171
ronment when considering preliminary injunction application.
Following Breyer's First Circuit analysis and the statutory
scheme and purpose approach, courts in the First Circuit, Ninth
Circuit, and D.C. Circuit, among others, adopted the relaxed view
172
of irreparable injury for actions brought for NEPA violations.
The Court in Winter, however, marooned the lenient perspective on
irreparable harm-despite its rational application in light of
NEPA's uniquely procedural nature. 173 By doing away with the lenient standard under NEPA claims, the Winter Court effectively precludes NEPA plaintiffs from achieving preliminary injunctive relief
where "likelihood" of irreparable harm is difficult or impossible to
174
prove in litigation.
VI.

IMPACT: WINTER'S EFFECT ON

NEPA CLAIMs

The Winter holding has shown the significance of national security interests when the Court exercises discretion in deciding to
fashion equitable relief.175 The Court also expressly set, and arguably raised, the bar for a requisite showing of irreparable harm to
obtain a preliminary injunction for NEPA actions. 176 Although narrow, the Court's decision is binding upon all courts, and thus may
affect all NEPA claims brought in the lower courts.
A. Weight of National Security
The Winter majority demonstrated the importance of national
security for both the public interest and for the Navy's interest in
171. See id. (stating harm to environment includes increased risk to environment through uninformed decision making).
172. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 656 (illustrating use of more lenient irreparable harm analysis); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 391-92

(2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing flexibility of equity jurisdiction). Justice Ginsburg's dissent discusses the inherent flexibility in equity jurisdiction:

"The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility, rather than rigidity has distinguished it." Id.
173. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 656 (addressing end of lenient standard).
The Court subtly and inconspicuously factored NEPA's scheme and purpose into
its balancing of the factors, thus calling attention to the importance of its procedure, but the national security interest was overwhelming. Id. at 657-58.
174. See id. at 657 (claiming Winter holding regarding irreparable harm standard precludes NEPA plaintiffs from obtaining preliminary injunction where
plaintiffs cannot establish likelihood of irreparable harm).
175. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381 (discussing weight of national security

interest).
176. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 656 (noting Court established strict likelihood standard for irreparable harm).
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effectively trained sailors. 177 Although the Court discounts neither
the public's environmental interest nor the effect of denying the
preliminary injunction on the NRDC's interests, the majority's focus on national security serves as the Court's justification for finding an abuse of discretion by the lower courts in fashioning
equitable relief, and it may be used persuasively in future cases. 1 78
Potential national security arguments in future cases could appeal
to the Winter rationale, serving as a proverbial trump card.
Courts could distinguish Winter on its narrow scope or on the
facts. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Winter six months later in
Internet Specialties West, Inc. v. Milon-DiGiorgioEnterprises, Inc., 17 9 a
case dealing with trademark issues, which affirmed an injunction
despite an appeal to Winters heavy public interest factor.' 80 The
weight of the national security argument, however, has not yet been
disturbed and may weaken pleas for environmental protection
under NEPA if these NEPA claims will infringe military activities or
other actions relating to national security. 8 1 NEPA and the environment may fall victim to this appeal to the national security
interest.

B.

Raising the Irreparable Harm Bar

NEPA plaintiffs seeking relief in the form of a preliminary injunction have an increased burden after Winter.'82 The relaxed
standard for irreparable harm for NEPA claims, as established in
previous cases, appears to have been set to the ordinary requisite
level of establishing a likelihood of irreparable harm. 183 The District Court for the Northern District of California in Save Strawberry
177. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376 (holding courts' abused discretion by issuing
injunctive relief regardless of whether NRDC proved irreparable harm).
178. See id. at 382 (noting importance of environmental group activities).
179. 559 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2009).
180. Internet Specialties W, Inc. v. Milon-DiGiorgioEnter., Inc., 559 F.3d 985, 99394 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Winter on grounds of insufficient similarity).
The Ninth Circuit distinguished between the public's national security in Winter
from the defendant-appellant's customers' interest. Id. The Internet Specialties majority notes that the dissent would have held the Ninth Circuit defied the Winter
holding by affirming the injunction and not giving more weight to the public interest. Id. at 994.
181. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381 (discussing weight of national security
interest).
182. See id. at 376 (discussing proper irreparable harm standard).
183. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 656, 670 (noting effects of Winter on lenient
standard of irreparable harm for claims brought under NEPA); see also Winter, 129
S. Ct. at 375-76 (setting standard of likelihood for irreparable harm); cf. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (explaining relaxed irreparable harm standard for
claims brought under NEPA).
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Canyon v. Department of Energy (Strawberry Canyon), 184 however, dis1 85
tinguished Winter and issued injunctive relief for the plaintiff.
The Strawberry Canyon court found that Winter only addressed
one of the two prongs of the preliminary injunction standard as
established by the Ninth Circuit prior to Winter-the likelihood of
success on the merits and possibility of irreparable harm prong. 186
The Supreme Court in Winter neglected, according to Strawberry
Canyon, to address the second prong: "A preliminary injunction is
appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates... that serious questions
going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips
sharply in the plaintiff's favor.' 8 7 The Winter holding, therefore,
might not preclude injunctive relief where the plaintiff cannot
show a likelihood of success on the merits, but can show irreparable
injury is likely and imminent and demonstrates serious meritorious
188
issues with a favorable balancing of the hardships.
While this holding allows plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief
without showing a likelihood of success on the merits, it still requires a showing of a likelihood of irreparable harm. 189 The Winter
likelihood standard may continue to impose an increased burden
for NEPA plaintiffs seeking relief via equitable remedies. 190 The
Winter holding also forecloses relief for NEPA plaintiffs who have
difficulty establishing likelihood of irreparable harm, or any degree
of irreparable harm acceptable in court. 19 1 For NEPA's and the environment's sake, hopefully the Winter holding continues to remain
narrow and tailored to the Navy's particular interest in antisubmarine warfare training in California, other significant military operations and activities, or when national security is truly and directly at
issue. Finally, to meet the Court's seemingly established likelihood
standard of irreparable harm for all NEPA claims, future NEPA
184. 613 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
185. See id. at 1180 n.2 (distinguishing Winter).
186. See id. (addressing two distinct prongs for determining appropriateness
of injunctive relief). The District Court emphasized "possibility," the standard set
by Ninth Circuit prior to being overruled in Winter. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375.
187. Strawbeny Canyon, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (quoting The Lands Council v.
McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)) (discussing second prong of preliminary injunction standard as established by Ninth Circuit before Winter decision).
188. See Strawberry Canyon, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 1181 (discussing legitimate issuance of injunctive relief via second prong of preliminary injunction standards established by Ninth Circuit).
189. See id. at 1180 (noting plaintiff must show irreparable injury is likely and
imminent).
190. See Eubanks, supra note 2, at 656-57 (claiming greater difficulty for NEPA
plaintiffs to obtain preliminary injunctions).
191. See id. (discussing failure to show likelihood of irreparable harm).
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plaintiffs must meet a higher burden of proof in litigation before
the courts.
John C. Stellakis*
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